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1. Introduction 
According to Franklin (1998, 109) Pascal’s (1952) wager 
and Leibniz’s theory that this is the best of all possible 
worlds are latecomers in the Faith-and-Reason tradition. 
Yet they have remained interlopers; for they have never 
been taken as seriously as the older arguments for the 
existence of God and other themes related to faith and 
reason. Yet Pascal’s wager is of interest for historians of 
probability and decision theorists for its first instance of 
explicitly decision theoretic reasoning in print and its 
invocation of infinite utility. Moreover, it is of interest for 
psychologists for its discussion of voluntarism and for 
philosophers of religion and theologians as a putative 
proof that belief in God is an obligation of rationality (Hajek 
2000, 1). Furthermore, as decision theory and the mathe-
matics of infinities are flourishing and have advanced 
rapidly over the last couple of years (McClennen 1994, 
115; Sobel 1996, 23; Vallentyne 2000) and as belief in 
God has grown over the last terrorist attacks and religions 
have multiplied over the last decades - just look at the new 
world religion of the Bahai’s -, it might be worthwhile to 
look at Pascal’s wager to get a new evaluation of the 
situation. 
So let’s have a look at one version of Pascal’s wager: 
suppose you are confronted with the following decision 
problem. There are two actions to choose from: either to 
bet on God, that is, a1, or to bet against God, that is, a2. 
Two states of the world can be the case: either God exists, 
that is, s1, or God doesn’t exist, that is, s2. If one combines 
the respective actions with the respective states of the 
world, the following outcomes ensue: infinite life, that is, 
o11, wretchedness, that is, o21, the life of a Christian, that 
is, o12, and the life of a non-Christian, that is, o22. So how 
should one decide rationally in this kind of a problem? 
 
 s1: God  
exists. 
s2: God  
doesn’t exist.  
a1: to bet  
on God. 
o11: infinite life (∞) o12: the life of a 
Christian (-10) 
a2: to bet 
against God. 
o21: wretchedness 
(-1000) 
o22: the life of a non-
Christian (+10) 
Figure 1. Decision matrix for Pascal’s wager. 
According to Rescher (1985, 7) - and I agree with him - 
Pascal’s wager doesn’t answer the question whether God 
exists, but whether we should accept that he exists. 
Moreover, this version of the wager also doesn’t deal with 
the question which kind of God exists; whether it is the 
God of the Protestants, of the Catholics, of Islam, of 
Judaism, of the Bahai’s, of a God who punishes those who 
bet on him and who supports those who don’t bet on him, 
whether the nontheistic view of Hinduism is true or the 
pantheism of Spinoza, etc. Yet this important issue which 
deals with the adequacy of the states of the world leads to 
the many-Gods objection (Jordan 1994). Furthermore, one 
might also want to question whether the actions are the 
right ones. For one might want to question the moral 
adequacy of these actions (Quinn 1994) and claim that 
adequate actions might be to belief in God and not to 
belief in God. Yet as Armour (1993, 2) has already 
observed: „We must constantly remember that one makes 
one’s bet in this case not by putting one’s money down at 
the two-dollar window but by acting as if God exists.” 
Moreover, Morris (1994, 57) has pointed out that „Belief is 
not under our direct voluntary control.” So the decision 
maker cannot simply choose to believe or not to believe, 
but has to bet on God’s existence or non-existence and act 
as if God exists. Yet whether this is true has to be 
discussed. Hence for decision problems like Pascal’s 
wager decision theory has two problems to solve: (1) 
which states of the world and which actions should figure 
in decision situations. (2) after having specified the states 
of the world and the actions which action should the 
decision maker decide for.  
Yet because of space restrictions I start with the above 
formulation of Pascal’s wager and take it as granted. Now 
the question arises how is one supposed to argue in this 
decision problem? One solution is to follow the principle of 
maximizing expected utility, where the expected utility for 
the respective actions can be calculated as follows 
(Savage 1954/1972): U(ai) = ∑
=
m
j
ijj )o(u)s(p
1
, that is, 
the utility U of an action ai is the sum of the weighted 
utilities of the outcomes u(oij), where the weights are the 
probabilities of the states of the world p(sj). The expected 
utility for a1 is then the following, if the probability for s1 is 
0.1 and the probability for s2 is 0.9: U(a1)=0.1x(∞)+0.9x(-
10)=infinite. The expected utility for a2 is: U(a2)=0.1x(-
1000)+0.9x(+10)=finite. Because the expected utility for a1 
is much bigger than the expected utility for a2 (even if the 
probability for God’s existence is very small!), and because 
it is rational to maximize one’s expected utility, one should 
decide for a1. Therefore it is rational to bet on God. 
2. Objections against Pascal’s Wager 
The following objections arise against this solution: (1) 
decision theory only allows for finite utility, so it cannot 
solve Pascal’s wager (Jeffrey 1983, 150; McClennen 
1994); (2) Bernoulli’s law of the diminishing marginal utility 
of money precludes infinite utilities (Sorensen 1994, 143); 
(3) certain assignments of vague probabilities to God’s 
existence scotch the wager (Hajek 2000); (4) satisficing 
one’s utility is better than maximizing one’s utility (Slote 
1989); (5) the utility of an action doesn’t only depend on 
the utilities of the outcomes, but also on other factors like 
the decision maker’s attitude towards risk and the amount 
of possible change from the decision maker’s reference 
point (Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988); (6) the many-Gods 
objection: there are more and/or other possibilities than 
God exists and God doesn’t exist as states of the world 
(Jordan 1994); (7) it is morally objectionable to bet on God 
(Franklin 1998; Quinn 1994). 
Because of space restrictions I will only look at objection 
(3): Hajek (2000, 2-3) has pointed out that Pascal’s wager 
depends on the decision maker assigning a probability 
greater than zero to God’s existence. Hence decision 
makers who can only assign a zero probability to God’s 
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existence maximize their expected utility by betting against 
God, and decision makers who cannot assign any pro-
bability to God’s existence cannot calculate their expected 
utility at all. One might object the following to these two 
counterexamples: Pascal neither wants to convince strict 
theists nor strict atheists by his wager, but those which 
remain suspended between a state of faith and one of 
unbelief. Moreover, one might want to ask are there really 
any strict atheists in this world? For if one is really 
desperate, doesn’t one usually pray to God? If one is at 
death’s door, doesn’t one think it is better to believe in 
God? Even John von Neumann, one of the pioneers of 
classical game theory, had converted to Catholicism by the 
time he was confined to bed by an advanced and incurable 
cancer, and he was reported to have said that Pascal had 
a point (Macrae 1992, 379). Furthermore, even if the 
probability the decision maker assigns to God’s existence 
is very small, to bet on God still obtains the best result. 
However, according to Jordan (1994, 108) the product of 
an infinitesimal and an infinite number is infinitesimal. If 
this is true (which it isn’t) and if one assigns an infinitesimal 
to God’s existence, then the principle of maximizing 
expected utility leads to bet against God. Yet Hajek (2000, 
3) has said that Pascal’s argument is addressed to human 
beings. And in fact human beings don’t assign infinitesimal 
probabilities to propositions. One may object to that 
although human beings in fact don’t assign infinitesimal 
probabilities to propositions, they can assign such proba-
bilities. For suppose a dart is thrown at a unit square. Can’t 
I assign an infinitesimal probability to its hitting a particular 
point in the square? Hence even though one in fact does 
not, one can also assign an infinitesimal probability to 
God’s existence. 
With regard to the case where decision makers cannot 
assign any probability to God’s existence the following can 
be said: Pascal’s wager simply doesn’t arise for them. 
Unfortunately Hajek doesn’t tell us which kind of decision 
makers he has in view. Very young children or mentally 
retarded people might not be able to assign any probability 
to God’s existence. For they might not have any concept of 
probability and/or of God yet. With regard to grown ups 
with a sound mind they might not be willing to assign any 
probability to God’s existence, but if one presses them to 
do so, I doubt that they cannot come up with some proba-
bility assignment. Hence this argument isn’t valid. 
Hajek (2000, 3) has pointed out that the belief states of 
humans are vague, that is, humans cannot assign 
probability, precise to indefinitely many decimal places, to 
all propositions. Moreover, Hajek (2000, 4) claims that 
vague beliefs will typically be represented by probability 
intervals. Yet with the exception of Kyburg (1980) all other 
decision theorists conceptualize their decision theories not 
in terms of interval probabilities, but in terms of point 
probabilities, so that they must have a justification for 
doing so.  
Two reasons for point probabilities and against interval 
probabilities come to my mind:  
(1) one should prefer a simpler decision theory to a more 
complicated one, if the former theory is as adequate as the 
latter for solving the problems in its field. Because a 
decision theory with point probabilities is simpler than a 
decision theory with interval probabilities, and because 
there is no reason why a decision theory with point 
probabilities shouldn’t be able to deal with all the problems 
in its field, whereas a decision theory with interval proba-
bilities is already limited in its applicability, a decision 
theory with point probabilities should be preferred to a 
decision theory with interval probabilities.  
(2) If one uses interval probabilities one has to provide a 
justification for both borders, whereas if one uses point 
probabilities one just has to justify one point. The former 
can be seen by the following: if the decision maker claims 
that his knowledge situation that it is very likely that there 
is good weather tomorrow is best represented by the 
probability interval (0.7, 0.9), one can ask the decision 
maker why his knowledge situation isn’t best represented 
by the probability interval (0.69, 0.91)? In the case of point 
probabilities one can only ask the decision maker why he 
uses this point, for example, P = 0.9 in the weather 
example, and not any other one, like P = 0.91. Because in 
the case of interval probabilities and in the case of point 
probabilities it is difficult to provide justifications, and 
because it is better to need as few justifications as 
possible, point probabilities should be preferred to interval 
probabilities. 
Moreover, Kyburg (1974, 264-267) admits in opposition 
to point probabilities interval probabilities only fulfil in 
certain special cases the axioms of a generalized mathe-
matical probability calculus for intervals. This is a serious 
defect of interval probabilities. For it is a minimal require-
ment in decision theory that the decision maker’s proba-
bilities are coherent. This can be achieved by fulfilling the 
axioms of the mathematical probability calculus. If the 
decision maker’s probabilities are incoherent, he is in a 
position to face a betting situation which has become 
known as "Dutch book". Therefore Kyburg’s interval proba-
bilities are limited in their applicability to certain special 
cases. Yet Hajek (2000, 5-6) objects that a sure way to 
avoid being Dutch booked is to remain totally vague, which 
is true, but has as a consequence that the decision maker 
isn’t willing to bet on anything anymore, which leads to 
complete inaction. I don’t think it is ideally rational never to 
decide anything in your whole life. However, one might be 
able to rewrite the axioms of the mathematical probability 
calculus in such a way that they can accommodate interval 
probabilities. Moreover, Dutch books might be avoided, if 
there is a suitable decision rule for use of interval-valued 
probabilities. Decision rules can look at bets already made 
and stay away from new bets that would make a Dutch 
book. 
Yet if one uses interval probabilities instead of point 
probabilities, why doesn’t one also use interval utilities 
instead of point utilities? After all in the game show The 
Price Is Right, humans have problems assigning prices to 
everyday goods, too, that is, they have vague conceptions 
which kind of price might be the right one with respect to 
particular goods. In my opinion using interval utilities 
instead of using point utilities leads to unnecessary compli-
cations of decision theory. That’s probably also the reason 
why one doesn’t find any decision theory with interval 
utilities. 1  
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